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Commentary

Law and Regulatory Competition: Can They CoExist?
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
It is possible to read Stephen Choi's article with admiration and

enjoyment-until a critical point is reached at its very end. In an analysis
that is balanced, nuanced, and thorough, Professor Choi initially reviews the
recent debate over the role of law in fostering the development of financial

markets. As others have also concluded, he finds a correlation between
quality of law and financial development. At a few points, he may accept too

easily the claim that the common law is superior to the civil law in fostering
economic growth, without adequately considering the problem of multicollinearity that usually confounds efforts to infer causation from
correlation.1 Still, his analysis is perceptive, reasonable, and well within the
mainstream of contemporary scholarship. Nor do I wish to challenge the
view that there are legal preconditions to the full development of financial
markets.

But in his conclusion, Professor Choi leaps from description to
prescription and focuses on "how to generate good law."2 Here he opines
that the best way to strengthen the legal framework essential to financial
development may be to encourage regulatory competition. He concludes by
suggesting that policymakers should "expend their limited political capital in

establishing policies to foster regulatory competition within their borders and
among different countries." 3 Alas, this is an overbroad non sequitur. Not

only does his prescription not follow from his diagnosis, but as discussed
below, it would prove perversely counterproductive to his goal of
strengthening law.
.

Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
1. I have elsewhere argued that the role of the state was more important than the quality of law
in influencing the development of securities markets. In particular, only those countries in which an
autonomous private sector had first developed were able to generate strong securities markets, while
countries that centralized economic decision-making in the state tended to rely on and foster central
banks as their preferred instrument of state-directed corporate finance. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Rise of DispersedOwnership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and
Control,111 YALELJ. 1 (2001).
2 See Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities
Markets, 80 TEXAS L.REv. 1657, 1726 (2002).
3. Id. at 1727.
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Unfair as it may seem to focus primarily on his concluding remarks, this
is where his analysis most intersects the concerns of this Symposium: how
can the law foster economic growth and development? Professor Choi has
developed his preferred prescription for strengthening law through regulatory
competition elsewhere at some length.4 His ideas have come to be known as
"issuer choice"--a right on the part of the issuer to choose the regime of
securities law and regulation under which it will operate.5 Under issuer
choice, a Delaware corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange
could choose to have its disclosure and other securities regulation standards
specified by the law of Taiwan, Italy, or some other jurisdiction. The basic
premise is that each issuer has the right incentives to choose the legal rules
that will maximize its share value.
Superficially plausible as Professor Choi's premise sounds, it does not
work-at least in this context-for a variety of independent reasons. In this
brief Comment, I will review some, but not all, of the objections to his
proposal. I will then turn to the broader topic of when, and to what extent,
regulatory competition may make sense.
I.

Issuers Do Not Necessarily Have the Right Incentives

The premise that issuers will act to maximize their share value is only
sometimes valid. From a global perspective, it is clear that corporations in
most jurisdictions are characterized by concentrated ownership, rather than
by the dispersed ownership that characterizes most public corporations in the
Anglo-American world.6 Firms with controlling shareholders (or at least
with a cohesive control group) do not necessarily want to maximize their
day-to-day share value, for at least two reasons: first, their controlling
shareholders may prefer to maximize the private benefits of control, even if
this implies a reduction in the price of the firm's shares; second, the control
group can remain indifferent to the firm's share value in the market because
they can sell their control block at a control premium well above that price in

4. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, PortableReciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); see also Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998);
Roberta Romano, The Needfor Competition in InternationalSecurities Regulation,2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 387, 388 (2001) (praising "the absence of a uniform international regulatory scheme"
as a benefit to investors).
5. For a critique of this position, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice Is Not Izvestor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) [hereinafter Fox,
Retaining Mandatory Disclosure] (advocating maintenance of the current system of mandatory
disclosure); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORIMCAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 564
(2001) [hereinafter Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate] (arguing that issuer choice would ultimately
decrease welfare because "the issuer's private costs of disclosure would be greater than the social
costs of such disclosure").
6. See Rafael La Porta, Francisco Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
CorporateOwnershipAround the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
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the private market for corporate control. Indeed, control premiums vary
enormously around the globe, suggesting that the private benefits of control
extracted from corporations under different legal regimes also vary
correspondingly. On this basis, it follows that corporations may not adopt
the efficient legal rule that maximizes share value by opting into the most
favorable legal regime because doing so might not be in the interest of
controlling shareholders. Even within the Anglo-American world of dispersed ownership, persuasive evidence indicates that, in choosing their
jurisdiction of incorporation, firms are motivated to seek the jurisdiction that
offers their managers the greatest protection from takeovers! Such evidence
hardly suggests that managers seek the most efficient legal rules, even absent
a controlling shareholder. In sum, if controlling shareholders and managers
often have the wrong incentives and will not choose the legal rules that
maximize the corporation's share value, it makes little sense to allow them to
opt out of the legal rules that regulators believe will best protect minority
investors.
II.

Even with the Right Incentives, Finns Will Pursue Private Wealth
Maximization, Not Social Efficiency

Assume in the alternative that corporations will act so as to maximize
shareholder value; that is, assume that no conflicts exist between shareholders and their managers or among majority and minority shareholders, so
that all will opt for the legal rule that maximizes the firm's value. Will this
lead to overall (or "social") efficiency? Not necessarily! Professor Merritt
Fox has shown that private firms will prefer legal rules that allow them to
make less than the socially optimal level of disclosure9 Firms do so, he
suggests, because they fear that further disclosure may permit their
competitors to exploit or profit from proprietary information that is released
under legal compulsion. Rational as this may sound for the firm, it produces
a sub-optimal level of disclosure that reduces overall market efficiency.
Only mandatory legal rules, he concludes, can produce the socially optimal
level of disclosure.
More recently, Professor Fox and his co-authors have found that
Securities and Exchange Commission rule revisions in the 1980s requiring
additional forward-looking disclosures increased the accuracy of share
7. See LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & ALMA COHEN, FIRMS' DECISIONS WHERETo LNCORPORATE
(Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 351, 2002), available at
http./Iwww.law.harvard.edu/programsolin-center (criticizing the view that the market for corporate
charters produces optimal corporate law rules and finding that the primary motivation for
reincorporations has been to avoid hostile takeovers).
8. See Fox, RetainingMandatoryDisclosure,supra note 5, at 1339 (arguing that "issuer choice
would lead U.S. issuers to disclose at a level significantly below this social optimum"); see also
Fox, The Issuer Ciwice Debate, supra note 5, at 564 (contending that "each issuer would select a
regime requiring a level of disclosure less than is socially optimal").
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pricing in the U.S. market.9 If they are right, and mandating such additional
disclosure improved market efficiency, then it seemingly follows that private
incentives alone did not produce the socially optimal level of disclosure. In
that case, deferring to private choice under a regime of issuer choice would
not necessarily enhance economic efficiency.
III. Network Externalities Necessitate Harmonization
Assume next that investors not only wish to understand and appraise a
corporate issuer but also to compare its performance to that of other
companies. Such comparative evaluations are greatly facilitated by issuers
subscribing to the same disclosure and accounting policies. For years,
international groups-the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Accounting Standards
Committee in particular'---have worked to harmonize disclosure and
accounting policies to achieve consistency and to facilitate comparisons. But
this is precisely the kind of harmonization to which Professor Choi objects.
The problem with regulatory competition in this context is that there are
positive externalities in everyone using the same language. Under an issuer
choice legal regime, some firms in the same market or on the same exchange
might use German accounting standards, others American standards, and still
others Japanese standards. The result is a Tower of Babel effect that impedes
effective comparison. This assessment does not require the assertion that one
accounting or disclosure language is superior to another, but only the more
modest claim that the burdens on investors are reduced by a common
language (or at least reconciliation to a common language).
The more persons using the same language, the greater the resulting
positive network externality.11
United States Generally Accepted
Accounting Procedure (GAAP) or International GAAP (IAS) thus can have
great value even without being inherently superior. Yet, an issuer seeking to
hide a problem might still prefer to use a different language that was less
9. See Artyom Durney, Merritt Fox, Randall Morck & Bernard Young, Share Price Accuracy
and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Presentation at American Law and Economics
Association Annual Meeting (May 12, 2001) (on file with the Texas Law Review). This research
does not demonstrate that these SEC reforms were cost efficient, and it can still be argued that any
enhancement in pricing accuracy came at too high a price. But at least this research seems to show
that mandatory law can improve market accuracy (although possibly at too costly a price).
10. For overviews of the international efforts to harmonize accounting and disclosure standards,
see Norman C. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of United States and Europe: Automation,
Globalizationand Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 407 (2001); Maureen Peyton King,
Note, The SEC's (Changing?)Stance on IAS, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 315 (2001).
11. The classic example of a positive network externality is the telephone network. If telephone
networks have few subscribers, they have little value. But if everyone subscribes, the value of the
network is much greater, and the value increases as each additional person hooks up to the network.
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolies, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133, 139-40.
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transparent. To be sure, the market may penalize it for doing so, but the
discount might be either too much or too little, and in either event pricing
accuracy suffers.
IV. Enforcement Is Feasible Only When Enforcers Are Enforcing a
Common Set of Rules
Further evidence that mandatory law creates value comes from
economic data showing that when insider-trading laws are enforced, the cost
of equity capital goes down.' 2 This is by itself an important finding that
strong laws can enhance efficiency. But these studies also show that it is
only the enforcement of the insider-trading prohibition, not its enactment,
that reduces the cost of equity capital.' 3 Merely adopting laws does little or
nothing.
In this light, an initial problem with issuer choice as the preferred
approach to securities regulation is that an issuer could opt out of specific
rules that seem desirable, including, for example, insider-trading
prohibitions. To be sure, a company's stock might suffer a measurable
market penalty as a result, which the minority shareholders would also bear
even though they lacked access to such information. Still, the expected gain
to the controlling shareholders from being able to engage in insider trading
could more than offset their loss from a reduced market price. Moreover, if
in one market some firms' managers and controlling shareholders could
engage in insider trading, while the other firms' personnel could not,
confusion and uncertainty would result, as investors could not be certain of
the applicable legal standards, at least without a costly inquiry. Worse, the
moral force of the law would be undercut, thus inviting evasion in cases
where insider trading was still prohibited. Because an issuer choice regime
would permit some firms to elect the laws of countries having no prohibition
on insider trading and other firms to elect legal rules that only partially or
weakly proscribe it, issuer choice seemingly enervates, rather than
strengthens, the force of law.
Even if all nations came to prohibit insider trading, or if some limitation
were placed on the scope of issuer choice, a problem would remain: as a
practical matter, no single enforcer could simultaneously enforce a diversity
of legal rules. Could the SEC or the Justice Department truly enforce the
laws of Japan, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico on insider trading (or on any other
issue)? It seems doubtful. Each case would require the agency to learn new
law and introduce the possibility that the foreign law was itself still
unresolved or internally inconsistent.
12. See Utpal Bhattachayra & Hazem Daouk, The World Price ofInsider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75,
97 (2002) (finding that the enforcement of insider-trading laws worldwide is associated with a 7%
reduction in the cost of equity).
13. Id. at 104.
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Beyond these simple points, there is a broader objection to regulatory
competition. Regulatory arbitrage was originally conceived as a cure to
overregulation. That is, if one jurisdiction regulated excessively, the subject
corporation could move its seat or assets to another. Indeed, the original
seminal article proposing regulatory competition focused on the possibility of
excessive subsidies or taxation.1 4 Subsequent commentators in this tradition
have sought to apply this model to very different contexts, without revising
or qualifying its very simplified assumptions. Their premise has been that
regulation, or at least monopolistic regulation by a single jurisdiction,
typically produces overregulation and hence some form of confiscatory
taxation. Even if this can happen, the commentators rarely defend the
premise that it is inevitable.
The countervailing and underrecognized danger is systematic
underregulation as a result of agency capture or interest group domination of
the political process. More importantly, the recent scholarship that Professor
Choi carefully traces argues that the optimal development of at least certain
financial institutions requires the prior development of an adequate
regulatory structure. This is the clear implication of the work of LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV), but it is also a central theme
in the work of legal scholars such as Professor Bernard Black.' 5 In short,
underregulation16 may be a greater danger to financial development than
overregulation.
In this light, there is a basic disconnect between Professor Choi's
conclusion that law matters and his prescription for regulatory competition.
Although regulatory competition may be a cure for overregulation, it tends to
aggravate underregulation. So long as there is one laggard or outlier
jurisdiction, some firms could elect its law under an issuer choice model. If
we assume that some non-trivial level of regulation is optimal, issuer choice
and regulatory competition will tend to impede its realization.
Admittedly, both overregulation and underregulation are dangers. Thus,
because all generalizations have their limitations, it is worth asking whether
there is any way in which regulatory competition could enhance the
14. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pot.. ECON. 416, 418
(1956) (discussing the argument that for local public goods, the "consumer-voter moves to that
community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences"). Tiebout's model has
received considerable criticism on both the empirical and normative levels. See, e.g., David Lowery
& William E. Lyons, The Impact of JurisdictionalBoundaries: An Individual-Level Test of the

Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73, 92-93 (1989); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 11-Localism
and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 415 (1990). Nonetheless, it remains highly influential
within "law and economics" circles. See Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 JL. & ECON. 23, 28-29 (1983).
15. See Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781 (2001) (discussing the laws and institutions necessary to a strong
securities market).
16. I do not mean to argue this thesis, but it does seem to be implied by the LLSV research,
supra note 6.
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development of an optimal regulatory structure (if we assume that market
forces alone may not achieve this result). That is, when is competition most
likely to produce better regulation?
When firms voluntarily opt into additional regulation above that
applicable in their host jurisdiction, the odds are strong that they are doing so
to please or satisfy some constituency. Precisely such a pattern characterized
the phenomenon of foreign firms cross-listing on the New York Stock
Exchange and Nasdaq, a practice which soared during the 1990s.17 In listing
on a U.S. exchange, a foreign firm subjects itself to U.S. securities law,
agrees to restate its financial statements to comply with U.S. GAAP, exposes
itself to public and private enforcement in the U.S., and submits to the
scrutiny of U.S. securities analysts. By doing so, the foreign firm credibly
commits itself to provide a higher level of disclosure. The firm thus reduces
informational asymmetries, and in response, the firm's stock market price
usually increases.' 8 In effect, the foreign issuer "bonds" its promise to fully
disclose by exposing itself to the U.S. litigation and enforcement system.
This is an example of a "race to the top." That is, issuers that wish to
increase their share price enter the U.S. market at least in part to compensate
for the weaker legal standards and enforcement mechanisms in their own
countries. But not all firms will enter the U.S. market, in part because many
firms have controlling shareholders who prefer to realize the private benefits
of control. Hence, one cannot expect that the desire to maximize share value
will alone prove adequate or self-enforcing.
The difference between opting into a superior regulatory structure as a
form of regulatory competition and issuer choice is quite simply that in the
former case the subject company does not escape one system of regulation in
favor of another. Rather, it cumulatively subjects itself to both systems.
This "exit-less" form of regulatory competition is in marked contrast to the
market for corporate charters where the subject corporation reincorporates,
hypothetically from California to Delaware, thereby escaping the former
state's laws for the latter's. Although scholars continue to debate whether
the market for corporate charters leads to efficient corporate-law rules, 9 the
evidence is clearer that firms that cross-list in the U.S. earn a significant
17. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Futureas History,: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 673 (1999) (describing the
growing number of foreign firms listed on principal U.S. exchanges).
18. For the clearest finding that the stock market responds positively to cross-listing in the U.S.,
see Darius Miller, The Market Reaction to InternationalCross-Listings: Evidencefrom Depository
Receipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 104 (1999). Theoretical research has long predicted that a
commitment to improved disclosure (and hence reduced informational asymmetries) would produce
a lower cost of capital. See Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrachia, Disclosure,Liquidityand
the Cost of Capital,461. FIN. 1325, 1325-26 (1991).
19. Compare ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 12 (1993)

(describing the growing number of foreign firms listed on principal U.S. exchanges), with Bebchuk
& Cohen, supra note 7, at 37 (stating that recent research calls for a reconsideration of the view that
is "positive on state competition").
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stock price premium for so doing.20 The point of this comparison is not to
attempt to resolve the long-standing debate over regulatory arbitrage in the
market for corporate charters, but to note that other forms of regulatory
competition, such as cross-listing, unambiguously do create value. The best
explanation for value creation through cross-listing is that these foreign
issuers are opting into the U.S. system to compensate for their home
country's weak legal protections for minority shareholders.21 In short, there
is a demand for "strong" law, because it enhances the firm's market
valuation.
So what is the bottom line? Precisely to the extent that one reaches the
empirical conclusion that Professor Choi has reached-that "strong" law is a
precondition to financial development-one should reject regulatory
arbitrage as a means of creating stronger law. In contrast, regulatory
competition-a broader concept-can sometimes create value, but it does so
most clearly when it supplements "weak" law or regulation, without
permitting the firm to escape or "exit" its home country's laws. Such "exitless" regulatory competition is benign, because it cannot succeed as a law
evasion strategy. In sum, opting into an additional legal regime is safe, but
opting out from the original jurisdiction's law increasingly seems
problematic to the extent that we recognize "strong" laws as a precondition
to economic development.

20. See Miller, supranote 18, at 111-18.
21. For this interpretation, see Coffee, supra note 17.

